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THE STATE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS*
G. Alan Tarr"
For the American states, this might well seem like the best of
times. Over the past few years, thanks to a vibrant national economy,
the fiscal situation in most states has seldom been better. Tax
revenues have outpaced estimates in recent years, allowing many
states to cut taxes without reducing spending on popular programs,
and several states have boasted substantial budget surpluses.' In
addition, the devolution of power from Washington, D.C. has
afforded the states new opportunities to innovate and to experiment.2
Meanwhile, recent Supreme Court rulings on federalism, together
with congressional enactments such as the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995, have guaranteed to the states a measure of
autonomy.3 One can well understand, then, why Governor Cecil
Underwood would proclaim to the West Virginia legislature that "I
can't remember a time brimming so completely with optimism and
opportunity."4
Yet, if one surveys the challenges facing the American states as
they embark on the new millennium, one might well choose to
temper that optimism. After all, the optimism about state prospects
Copyright 2001, by LouIsIANA LAW REvIEW.
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1. Every state reported revenues exceeding expenditures in both 1997 and
1998. See 33 Book of the States 2000-01, at 270 tab. 6.8; 271 tab. 6.9 (2000)
[hereinafter 33 Book of the States].
2. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Constructing a New Federalism,
14 Yale L & Pol'y Rev. 297 (1996); Candice Hoke, State Discretion Under New
Federal Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality and a Federalism-Based
Constitutional Challenge, 9 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 115 (1998).
3. 2 U.S.C. § § 1501-1571 (2000); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119
S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 549, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
4. Dag Ryen, Introduction to 32 Book of the States 1998-99, at xvii, xv
(1998).
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stems largely from the fact that a robust American economy has filled
state coffers to overflowing. Obviously, one cannot expect the
economic boom to last forever-indeed, as I write in mid-2000, there
are disquieting signs on the horizon-although one suspects that most
politicians are fervently praying that the boom continues at least until
after the next election. When the economic good times end, as
inevitably they must, will the states be able to generate the revenues
necessary to meet their responsibilities?
This is not an idle question. Devolution has not only increased
the states' autonomy but has also expanded their responsibilities, and
meeting those responsibilities costs money. Moreover, the states may
discover that their ability to generate revenue has diminished.
Traditionally, a major source of funding for state governments has
been the sales tax, but the expansion of internet commerce is likely
to reduce revenues from that source.5 And, there is no obvious new
source of revenue, like gambling during the 1980s and 1990s, that
states can look to as a substitute for funding via taxes.6 Further
complicating the fiscal future of certain states are constitutional
restrictions that have been imposed in recent decades in California,
Colorado, Nevada, and other states that limit the authority of state
legislatures to tax and/or spend.7
5. Sales and gross receipts taxes accounted for 47.9% of state revenues in
1997. See 33 Book of the States, supra note 1, at 304 tab. 6.27. However, a
substantial proportion of transactions now occur on the internet. In the last quarter
of 1999, for example, internet transactions amounted to $5.3 billion. See U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Retail E-commerce Sales for the Fourth Quarter 1999 Reach$5.3 Billion 1 (2000). This increasing use of the internet has helped erode the
traditional sales-tax base available to the states, because Congress in 1998 enacted
the Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. C, Title XI, 112 Stat.
2681-719 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) and 19
U.S.C. § 2241 (1994 & Supp. 2000)), which included a moratorium on new or
"discriminatory" internet taxes. The Act also established the Advisory Commission
on Electronic Commerce, which was directed to report to Congress on the various
issues involving internet commerce. Id. at 1102. Although the Commission
attained the required super-majority support for several recommendations, it failed
to achieve it for the topic of internet taxation. The consequences of failing to attain
a satisfactory resolution of the issue may be substantial. Estimates of the potential
revenue loss range from $500 million in 1999 to as high as $10 billion by 2003.
See James McQuivey & Gillian DeMaulin, States Lose Half a Billion in Taxes to
Web Retail 2 (2000). For a thorough overview of the issue, see David C. Powell,
Internet Taxation and US. IntergovernmentalRelations: From Quill to the Present,
30 Publius 39 (2000).
6. In 1997, gross revenues in the American states from parimutuel and
amusement taxes and lotteries totaled $35,844,000,000. See U.S. Census Bureau,
Statistical Abstract of the United States 333 tab. 528 (1998).
7. See e.g., Cal. Const. art. XIIIA. The key development here was the
adoption of Proposition 13 in California in 1978, which permanently limited
property tax rates. Other states followed California's lead. For overviews of these
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The challenges facing state governments at the dawn of the
twenty-first century, of course, are not exclusively fiscal. The
devolution of policy-making responsibility from Washington D.C.,
as well as the responsibilities that state governments have
traditionally shouldered, means that the states must discover how to
address new problems and must seek solutions for long-standing,
intractable ones. During the 1960s and 1970s, commentators
frequently raised questions about state government capacity and
whether states had the ability to manage and implement programs to
deal with pressing concerns.' These concerns led to notable reforms
in state government, ranging from strengthening the governors'
appointment, personnel, and budgetary powers to professionalizing
state legislatures and consolidating state bureaucracies." Despite
these noteworthy innovations, one must acknowledge that those same
questions remain today.
Finally, state governments must address the twin specters of
citizen disinterest and citizen dissatisfaction, or what might be called
the D & D challenge. Public interest and involvement in state
developments, see John L. Mikesell, The Path of the Tax Revolt: Statewide
Expenditure and Tax Control Referenda Since Proposition 13, 18 State & Local
Govt. Rev. 5 (1986); Terry Schwadron, California & the American Tax Revolt:
Proposition 13 Five Years Later (1984); Steven D. Gold, The Tax Revolt 10 Years
Later, 14 St. Legis. 17 (1998). The revenue limitations had some effect on state
expenditures, since most state constitutions contain balanced-budget provisions that
prohibit deficit spending, although how effective these provisions are in practice is
open to question. See Richard Briffault, Balancing Acts: The Reality Behind State
Balanced Budget Requirements (1996).
States have also imposed limitations on the taxing power. Three states
have established a supermajority requirement for the enactment of tax increases.
See Okla. Const. art. V, § 33; Ariz. Const. art. IX, § 22; Nev. Const. art. IV, § 18.
Three other states have tied increases in spending to the rate of inflation and
population increases. See Cal. Const. art. XIIIB, § 1; Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(7);
Wash. Rev. Code § 43.135.035(1994). The California provision was subsequently
amended by Proposition 98 in 1988 and Proposition 111 in 1990, thereby blunting
its effect on state expenditures. See Joseph R. Grodin et al., The California State
Constitution: A Reference Guide 251-252 (1993). Finally, Colorado has mandated
that voters approve by referendum all new taxes. See Colo. Const. art. X, § 20.
8. These concerns are summarized in U.S. Advisory Comm'n on
Intergovernmental Relations, The Question of State Government Capability (1985).
For arguments that the states had developed the capacity to govern effectively, see
Mavis Mann Reeves, The States as Polities: Reformed, Reinvigorated, Resourceful,
509 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 83 (1990); Ann O'M. Bowman & Richard
C. Kearney, The Resurgence of the States (1986).
9. Thad Beyle, Governors: The Middlemen and Women in Our Political
System, in Politics in the American States (Virginia Gray & Herbert Jacob eds., 5th
ed. 1996) [hereinafter Beyle]; Larry Sabato, Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie: The
American Governorship Transformed 61-63 (2nd ed. 1983); John Kincaid, The New
Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism, 26 Rutgers L.J. 913, 927
(1995).
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government is minimal. The turnout of eligible voters in state
elections was abysmal and it is declining from that level. In 1998, for
example, congressional seats and important state races were at issue;
however, the national turnout was only thirty-six percent, just over
1/3 of the eligible electorate. 10 In states that hold their state elections
in odd-numbered years, when there are no national races to excite
interest, the figures are even more discouraging. In my own state of
New Jersey, for example, only thirty-one percent of eligible voters
bothered to participate in electing the state legislature in 1999."
These figures illustrate a continuing pattern of citizen disengagement
from state government and from government in general. This pattern
is troubling and must be addressed.
Even as state legislatures reduced taxes and funded programs in
the late 1990s, presumably popular courses of action, poll data
revealed a pervasive dissatisfaction and distrust of state government.
Once again, this is part of a nationwide pattern affecting all levels of
government. A national poll conducted in 1995, for example, found
that only a quarter of respondents indicated "a great deal" or "quite
a lot" of confidence in state government.'" And when citizens have
had the opportunity, they have expressed their distrust by approving
measures designed to limit the tenure of state officeholders, to
circumscribe their powers, and to transfer policymaking
responsibilities to the people acting directly.
Thus, during the 1990s, voters in twenty-one states established
term limits for state legislators, and in five states they placed such
limits on executive branch officials as well. 3  California
complemented its attack on incumbency with the adoption of
Proposition 140, which prohibited legislators from earning state
10. Richard M. Scammon et al., America Votes 23: A Handbook of
Contemporary American Election Statistics (1998). The voting age population
consists ofall citizens of minimal voting age, including those not registered to vote.
Id.
11. <http://www.state.nj.us/lps/elections/elec1999/gen-turnout_1999.html>
(web site no longer available) (on file with the State of New Jersey Department of
Law & Public Safety, Division of Elections, P.O. Box 304, Trenton, New Jersey,
08625).
12. Poll Data collected by the Council for Excellence in Government (Apr. 18,
1995), available at <http://www.excelgov.org/publication/pol195/survey.htm>.
13. For an overview ofstate constitutional provisions imposing term limitations
on state legislators, see Keon S. Chi & Drew Leatherby, State Legislative Term
Limits (1998). On the development of term limitations in the states, see John D.
Rausch, Jr., The Politics of Term Limitations, in Constitutional Politics in the
States: Contemporary Controversies and Historical Patterns (G. Alan Tarr ed.,
1996); Congressional Quarterly, Limiting Legislative Terms (Gerald Benjamin &
Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992); Samuel C. Patterson, Legislative Politics in the
American States, in Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis 135
(Virginia Gray & Herbert Jacob eds., 6th ed. 1996); Beyle, supra note 9, at 180.
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retirement benefits and required major reductions in legislative
agencies and staff.4 Other states have amended their constitutions
to authorize the recall of state elected officials. Minnesota in 1996
brought the number of states employing this device to eighteen. 5
Initiatives in three states have required a super-majority in the
legislature to enact tax increases. Initiatives in two other states have
tied increases in spending to the rate of inflation and to population
increases. Additionally, a Colorado initiative has required voter
approval for all new taxes. 6  Indeed, the proliferation of
constitutional initiatives itself suggests a profound skepticism about
whether the institutions of state government can be relied upon to
enact good policy. 7
It would be naive, of course, to suggest that all of the problems
I have described are constitutional problems, or that they all are
susceptible to a constitutional resolution. Yet, I think it would be
equally naive to assume that state constitutions are irrelevant to
solving any of these problems. Simply put, state constitutions do
matter. They create the institutions of state government, and the
structure of those institutions affects the policies that they produce.
State constitutions influence how effectively state governments can
address policy concerns. They also forge the links between state
governments and the citizens of those states, and at their best, they
embody the aspirations of those citizens.' 8
The crucial role played by state constitutions underscores the
importance of reexamining them periodically. 9 Several basic
questions suggest themselves. What is the state of state
constitutions? Do they need to be revised to deal with the
aforementioned problems and with other challenges facing state
governments as they enter the twenty-first century? If they do, how
should they be changed to promote more effective, more responsive,
14. Cal. Const. art. IV, § 1.5.
15. For a listing of the twenty states that permit the recall of elected officials,
see 33 the Book of the States, supra note 1, at 248-49 tab. 5.23 (2000).
16. See supra note 7.,
17. For a discussion of the genesis and implications of this new constitutional
populism, see G. Alan Taff, Understanding State Constitutions 157-161 (1998)
[hereinafter Tarr, Understanding State Consitutions]; G. Alan Tarr, ForthePeople:
Direct Democracy in the State Constitutional Tradition, in Reason or Folly? Public
Opinion and Direct Democracy Today (Elliott Abrams ed., forthcoming Dec. 2001).
18. For illuminating discussions of the functions served by American state
constitutions, see Donald S. Lutz, The Purposes ofAmerican State Constitutions,
12 Publius 27 (1982); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24
Win. & Mary L. Rev. 169 (1983); Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its
Function and Form for Our Time, 54 Va. L. Rev. 928 (1968) [hereinafter Grad].
19. The importance of periodic reexamination 'of state constitutions was
recognized from the very outset. See Va. Decl. of Riglt s art. I, § 15.
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and more accountable government? And once reformers have
determined the direction of constitutional reform, how can they
overcome the obstacles that have blocked such reform in the past?
I offer no pat answers to those questions.2 ° But, let me offer a
few broad-brush observations about contemporary American state
constitutions, keeping in mind always that, given their diversity,
almost any statement made about state constitutions is bound to be
true of some of them and not true of others.
First, American state constitutions tend to be "old"--the average
state constitution has been in operation for over a century.2' Most
current constitutions date from the late nineteenth century. Only
twelve states revised their constitutions during the twentieth century,
although five others did draft their initial constitutions within the last
one hundred years. Of course, there is nothing intrinsically wrong
with "old" constitutions-the Federal Constitution was drafted in
Philadelphia two hundred and thirteen years ago, and most of us have
no desire to see it replaced. Indeed, one might suggest that for
constitutions, durability is a virtue rather than a vice." Yet, unlike
20. For expert assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of current state
constitutions, see Center for State Constitutional 'Studies, Rutgers University-
Camden, Conference on "The State of State Constitutions" (May 4-6, 2000),
available at <http://www-camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/index2l sta.html>.
21. For a convenient listing of the dates of adoption of all the constitutions of
the American states, see 33 Book of the States, supra note 1, at 3 tab. 1.1.
22. This, at least, was the opinion of James Madison. See The Federalist No.
49 (James Madison). However, not all constitutional commentators shared
Madison's concern for constitutional stability. Thomas Jefferson, for example,
argued that constitutions should be periodically revised, in part to ensure that they
reflected the perspective of each new political generation and in part to take
advantage of developments in constitutional knowledge and experience. See Letter
of September 6, 1789, in Writings of Thomas Jefferson 959 (Merrill Peterson ed.,
1984). Madison responded to Jefferson's letter with a critique of Jefferson's
position and a reiteration of his own. See Letter of February 4, 1790, in 13 The
Papers of James Madison 22 (Charles Hobson & Robert Rutland eds., 1981). The
Madison-Jefferson debate is brilliantly analyzed in Stephen Holmes,
Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in Constitutionalism and
Democracy (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). Whatever the merits of the
competing positions, the Jeffersonian perspective found considerable support in the
American states. During the nineteenth century, the states regularly revised their
constitutions to take account of advances in constitutional knowledge. This
understanding of constitution-making as a progressive enterprise, requiring the
constant readjustment of past practices and institutional arrangements in light of
advances in knowledge and changes in circumstances, is documented in Christian
G. Fritz, Constitution Making in the Nineteenth-Century American West, in Law for
the Elephant, Law for the Beaver: Essays in the Legal History of the North
American West 292, 302-04 (John McLaren et al. eds., 1992); Christian G. Fritz,
The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on
State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West, 25 Rutgers L.J. 945,
975-84 (1994); Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American
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the Federal Constitution, contemporary state constitutions do not
continue in operation because of popular veneration for the document
or for its drafters.23 Indeed, state constitution-makers during the
nineteenth century, when most of these constitutions were written,
would have rejected outright such a deference to the past. They
viewed constitution-making as a progressive enterprise, and they
assumed that periodic revision of state constitutions was not only
proper but necessary.24 Certainly thepoll data mentioned earlier
belie any notion that the "old" state constitutions have survived
because of widespread popular satisfaction with the governments that
they have created.25
If a constitutional amendment indicates a defect in a constitution,
then one can conclude that these older state constitutions-and the
"younger" ones too, for that matter-have not survived because they
have successfully solved the problems besetting the states.2 6 Most
state constitutions have been amended more than once for every year
that they have been in operation, a proliferation of amendments that
shows that there is no reluctance to tinker with the handiwork of the
founders of state constitutions.2 7  Indeed, the frequency of
amendment has actually risen as the twentieth century has drawn to
a close.28 Regardless of the wisdom of particular amendments, there
is simply something wrong with that picture. If nothing else, the
number of amendments over time has destroyed whatever initial
coherence a state constitution might have had.2 9 And piecemeal
Politics Since Independence 91 (1987),
23. A telling statistic: in a 1991 survey, only 52 percent of respondents even
knew that their state had its own constitution. See U.S. Advisory Comm'n on
Intergovemmental Relations, Changing Public Attitudes on Governments and Taxes
14 (1991).
24. See Fritz, supra note 22; Rodgers, supra note 22.
25. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. James Madison, in Federalist No. 49, makes the argument that
constitutional changes are indicative of constitutional deficiencies and thus
undermine popular attachment to a constitution. His views are analyzed in Sanford
Levinson, "Veneration "and Constitutional Change: James Madison Confronts the
Possibility of Constitutional Amendment, 21 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 2443, 2450-55(1990). For a discussion of the view that the frequency of state constitutional
change reflects deficiencies in state constitutions, see Tarr, Understanding State
Constitutions, supra note 17, at 37-40.
27. This figure is computed from data in 33 Book of the States, supra note 1,
at 3 tab. 1.1. See also id. for data on the pace of state constitutional change in
recent years.
28. Id.
29. Bruce Ackerman has explored the notion of constitutional coherence and
the effects of constitutional amendment on such coherence with regard to the
Federal Constitution. See I Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, chapter
4 (1991). For discussion of the problem of constitutional coherence at the state
2001]
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amendment may actually have precluded the more encompassing
review of the adequacy of a state constitution that would have been
possible in a constitutional convention.
When one turns from the process of constitutional change to the
substance of state constitutions, there is also cause for concern. I am
not worried about state provisions dealing with ski trails in New
York or highway routes in Minnesota 3 -such provisions, while
quaint and faintly comical, have no significant effect on the
performance of state government. 3' But one can easily generate a
litany of important questions. Does a plural executive, such as exists
in states that elect their secretary of state, their attorney general, and
so on, promote accountability, or does such a fragmentation of
executive power imperil governmental effectiveness? 32 Do the
procedural checks imposed on state legislatures promote deliberation
and transparency, as their proponents insist, or do they merely
impede the enactment of important legislation?" Do constitutional
debt limits and constitutional requirements of balanced budgets
promote fiscal responsibility, or do they merely preclude necessary
flexibility in fiscal management?34 Does the election of judges
undermine judicial independence, or does it promote a necessary
accountability? 35 Does the inclusion of public policy provisions in
state constitutions promote popular control over government, or do
level, see Taff, Understanding State Constitutions, ,supra note 17, at 191-94.
30. N.Y. Const. art. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. XIV, § 2.
31. See generally James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 761, 819-20 (1992) (providing additional
examples of such provisions).
32. For data on the number of independently elected executive officials in the
various states, see 33 Book of the States, supra note 1, at 33 tab. 2.10.
33. For surveys of these various provisions and their effects, see Tarr,
Understanding State Constitutions, supra note 17, at 16-17; Michael W. Catalano,
The Single Subject Rule: A Check on Anti-Majoritarian Logrolling, 3 Emerging
Issues in State Con. Law 77 (1990); Millard H. Ruud, No Law ShallEmbrace More
Than One Subject, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 389 (1958); Robert F. Williams, State
Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and
Judicial Enforcement, 17 Publius 91 (1987).
34. See Briffault, supra note 7.
35. The literature on this topic is vast and contentious. For valuable
contributions to the debate, see Philip L. Dubois, From Ballot to Bench: Judicial
Elections and the Quest for Accountability (1980); Richard A. Watson & Rondal
G. Downing, The Politics of the Bench and the Bar: Judicial Selection Under the
Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan (1969); Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on
the Judiciary, 80 Judicature 165 (1997); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan,
Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill ofRights and the Next
Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 759 (1995); Jona Goldschmidt, Merit
Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 1 (1994);
Peter D. Webster, Selectioh and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best"
Method?, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
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they unduly hamper legislatures seeking to respond to changing
problems?3
To anyone with more than a cursory acquaintance with state
constitutions, this list of questions should sound quite familiar.
These questions reflect the concerns that underlay the development
of the Model State Constitution in the early years of the twentieth
century." This, in turn, suggests two overarching questions that will
help focus the reexamination of the state of state constitutions. First,
is the agenda of constitutional reform that dominated most of the
twentieth century, and is implicit in these questions, still pertinent for
dealing with the problems confronting state governments in the early
decades of the twenty-first century? And second, even if it is, do the
solutions proposed by twentieth-century reformers still make sense
today? Note that the reformers' prescriptions do almost nothing to
address the "D & D problems" identified earlier.38
The very fact that I am reiterating the concerns of previous
generations of reformers, of course, underscores a further point. For
the most part, these earlier reformers failed. Otherwise, one would
not see so many states operating under nineteenth-century--or even
eighteenth-century---constitutions. Moreover, most states that
revised their constitutions during the twentieth century introduced
only limited changes. And, when constitutional conventions
proposed strongly reformist constitutions, as in Maryland for
example, their proposals went down to ignominious defeat.39 For
36. For the case in favor of inclusion of such provisions, see Tarr,
Understanding State Constitutions, supra note 17, at 125-26. For the case against
their inclusion, see David Fellman, What Should a State Constitution Contain?, in
Major Problems in State Constitutional Revision (W. Brooke Graves ed., 1960);
Grad, supra note 18.
37. See Model St. Const. (1st ed. 1924). For the development of the Model
State Constitution, see Frank M. Stewart, A Half Century of Municipal Reform: A
History of the National Municipal League, chapter 2 (1950). For the political
theory underlying the Model State Constitution, see Daniel J. Elazar, The Principles
and Traditions Underlying American State Constitutions, 12 Publius 22 (1982);
Kermit L. Hall, Mostly Anchor and Little Sail: The Evolution ofAmerican State
Constitutions, in Toward a Usable Past: Liberty Under State Constitutions 388,407-
10 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991).
38. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
39. For a discussion of the failed Maryland effort at constitutional reform, see
John P. Wheeler, Jr. & Melissa Kinsey, Magnificent Failure: The Maryland
Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968 (1972). Whether the effort can be
pronounced a complete failure is open to question because several proposals by the
delegates were subsequently adopted seriatim. See Dan Friedman, Magnificent
Failure Revisited: Modern Maryland Constitutional Law from 1967 to 1998, 58
Md. L. Rev. 528 (1999). For a more general overview of the politics of state
constitutional conventions, see Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr. et al., State Constitutional
Conventions: The Politics of the Revision Process in Seven States (1975)
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whatever reasons, the constitutional reformers were unable to "sell"
their vision of state government and state constitutions to the public.
Perhaps they were inept politicians. Or perhaps they had the wrong
message.40 The exact cause of their failure is worth considering as
we seek to chart directions for constitutional reform in the twenty-
first century.
How will that reform come to pass? Although states vary in the
mechanisms they have instituted for constitutional amendment, they
share the view that constitutional revision should come via a
constitutional convention.4 During the nineteenth century, such
conventions were common--over the course of the century, the
American states held one hundred and forty-four constitutional
conventions. 42 In one decade alone, over half the existing states held
conventions.43 For most of the nineteenth century, constitutional
conventions were viewed as a mechanism for popular government,
a means by which the people could outflank established
governmental institutions and replace the ordinary politics of
parochial advantage and corruption with a politics of the popular will
and the common good.44
During the twentieth century, however, that understanding of the
constitutional convention largely disappeared. The convention
instead came to be seen as distant from the general populace, another
forum in which elite reformers and entrenched interests competed for
political power. There was very little interest in popular perspectives
or popular concerns. Whatever the validity of that understanding of
[hereinafter Comwell].
40. See Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, supra note 17, at 157; John
Kincaid, The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism, 26 Rutgers
L.J. 913 (1995).
41. Even those states that have instituted the constitutional initiative typically
distinguish between amendment and revision ofthe state constitution, requiring that
initiatives deal only with a single subject rather than undertaking more
comprehensive constitutional change. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. XVIII, § 3; Fla.
Const. art. XI, § 3. State courts have enforced these single-subject requirements.
See, e.g., Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990); In re Initiative Petition
No. 344, 797 P.2d 326 (Okla. 1990); Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351 (Fla.
1984); Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1970). For overviews of state
judicial supervision of the process of constitutional amendment in the states, see
Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword: The Direct Ballot and State Constitutionalism, 28
Rutgers L.J. 787 (1997); Robin Charlow, JudicialReview, EqualProtection andthe
Problem with Plebiscites, 79 Comell L. Rev. 527 (1994); Julian N. Eule, Judicial
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L. J. 1503 (1990).
42. For data on nineteenth-century constitutional conventions in the states, see
Albert L. Strum, The Development ofAmerican State Constitutions, 12 Publius 57,
83 (1982).
43. Rodgers, supra note 22, at 94 (showing that more than half of the existing
states held conventions from 1844-1853).
44. See Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, supra note 17, at 125-26.
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conventions, it had its effect. The number of constitutional
conventions declined precipitously over the course of the twentieth
century.45  State electorates regularly voted against calling
conventions, and on several occasions they rejected the constitutions
submitted to them by conventions.46  Therefore, if constitutional
reform is to proceed through constitutional revision, an initial step
must be to ensure that the constitutional convention once again
becomes a people's institution and, equally important, an institution
that fairly represents all segments of the state's population.47
Failing that, reform will have to occur piecemeal through
constitutional amendment, whether proposed by the legislature,
constitutional commissions, or initiative.4' There are certainly
disadvantages with such a piecemeal approach. Among them, as
mentioned earlier, is the possibility of undermining constitutional
coherence. Nevertheless, amendments can introduce significant
reforms, as illustrated by the success of the recent constitutional
commission in Florida.4 ' And, Florida is not an isolated example:
within the past two years, campaigns for constitutional reform have
begun in Alabama, Oklahoma, and Texas.5 Other states may follow
suit. Indeed, over the next decade, voters in ten states will have the
45. For data on twentieth-century constitutional conventions, see Sturm, supra
note 42, at 56-60 tab. 11; Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, supra note 17,
at 136-137. For an analysis of the causes and consequences of the disappearance
of the constitutional convention, see Robert F. Williams, Are Constitutional
Conventions Things of the Past? The Increasing Role of the Constitutional
Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1 Hofstra J. Pub. Pol'y 1 (1996).
46. From 1950 to 1968, for example, state legislatures proposed twenty-two
conventions, but in only eleven instances were the convention calls approved. See
Sturm, supra note 42, at 81. During that same period, voters in three states rejected
proposed constitutions. Id. at 56-60 tab. 11.
47. On the issue of fair representation in state constitutional conventions, see
Richard Briffault, The Voting Rights Act and the Election of Delegates to a
Constitutional Convention, in Decision 1997: Constitutional Change in New York
445 (Gerald Benjamin & Henrik N. Dullea eds., 1997).
48. For a comprehensive overview of the mechanisms for constitutional
amendment in the various states, see 33 Book of the States, supra note 1, at 5.9
tabs. 1.2-1.4.
49. See Robert F. Williams, Is Constitutional Revision Success Worth its
Popular Sovereignty Price?, 52 Fla. L. Rev. 249 (2000).
50. For information on the Alabama campaign, see the Alabama Citizens for
Constitutional Reform, available at
<http://www.constitutionalreform.org/home.html> (last visited Nov. 2,2001). For
information regarding the Oklahoma Academy's annual conference, held Apr. 6-7,
2000, on the reform of the Oklahoma Constitution, see The Oklahoma Academy,
News from the Academy, available at
<http://www.okacademy.org/whatsnew.html> (last visited Nov.2, 2001). On the
efforts to revise the Texas constitution, see House Select Comm. On Constitutional
Revision, H.R. Rep. 2000 (Tex. 2000).
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opportunity to determine whether or not a constitutional convention
should be called." Certainly, these opportunities for constitutional
reform underscore the point that an inquiry into the state of state
constitutions is both timely and important.
AN AGENDA FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The American states are assuming new responsibilities for policy
development and implementation as power is devolved from the
Federal Government to state governments. The constitutional
frameworks in these states will have a significant influence on how
effectively the states meet these new responsibilities. Yet, more than
two-thirds of the American states operate under constitutions that are
more than a century old, and were designed to meet the problems of
another era. Furthermore, they are riddled with piecemeal
amendments that have destroyed their coherence as plans of
government. Moreover, public disdain for government at all levels
demonstrates the need for constitutional reforms designed to increase
the responsiveness of state institutions. Finally, the increasing resort
to direct democracy for policymaking in the states suggests the
importance of crafting mechanisms for direct popular involvement
that do not preclude serious deliberation about policy options.52
Can such reforms be introduced? Part of the problem is political.
One can scarcely overestimate the inertia and distrust that will have
to be overcome to introduce significant constitutional reforms, even
in those states most in need of constitutional change. Thus, such
change will not occur without strong political leadership and broad
grass-roots support. 3 Nevertheless, the legal requirements for
51. Voters in fourteen states will have that opportunity because of provisions
in their state constitutions that mandate a periodic submission to the voters of the
question of whether to have a constitutional convention. See 33 Book of the States,
supra note 1, at 8 tab. 1.4.
52. For data on the increasing use of the initiative and referendum in recent
years, see the Initiative & Referendum Institute, In Depth Studies, available at
<http://www.iandrinstitute.org> (last visited Nov. 2, 2001). For useful discussions
of the phenomenon, see Shaun Bowler et al., Citizens as Legislators: Direct
Democracy in the United States (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998); Jack Citrin,
Who's the Boss? Direct Democracy and Popular Control of Government, in
Broken Contract: Changing Relationship Between Americans and Their
Government (Stephen C. Craig ed., 1996); Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan,
Demanding Choices: Opinion, Voting, and Direct Democracy (1998). For
proposals on how to make direct democracy more deliberative, see Benjamin R.
Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (1984).
53. As former Governor George D. Busbee of Georgia observed:
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constitutional amendment and revision in most states are
considerably less onerous than are the requirements for changing the
Federal Constitution. 4 Moreover, the success stories ofthe twentieth
century, such as the introduction of dramatically improved
constitutions in New Jersey,Montana, and Virginia, demonstrate that
reform is not an unreasonable goal.
The other part of the problem is, of course, determining what
changes should be made in state constitutions. In deciding what
changes to introduce, reformers have characteristically looked to
constitutional models in revising their state constitutions. During the
nineteenth century, delegates to constitutional conventions used
compendia of state constitutions to guide their deliberations."
During the twentieth century, they usually consulted the Model State
Constitution that was originally developed by the National Municipal
League in the 1920s. 6 However, it is unlikely that a document
devised during the Progressive Era and reflecting the political
perspective dominant during that period will be adequate for
addressing twenty-first-century problems. A crucial step in
promoting constitutional reform, therefore, is the development of a
new model that can inform and structure the debate in states
contemplating constitutional reform. The new model can provide a
resource and a weapon for those advocating positive constitutional
change. 7 Such a model would draw upon the experience of the states
and analyze the effects of various constitutional choices that the
states have made. It would also identify the major problems facing
state governments at the outset of the twenty-first century and the
ways in which constitutional choices might affect the ability of the
Constitutional revision is not for the faint of heart. It is not a Sunday drive
in the mountains. It is an incredibly difficult, sometimes tedious,
sometimes exhilarating, always challenging undertaking requiring the
cooperation of the leadership of the three branches of state government,
of counties, and municipalities, and local school boards, of the business
community and the labor community, ofpublic interest groups and private
interest groups, of people inside the government and people outside the
government-in short, it requires the cooperation ofjust about everybody.
George D. Busbee, An Overview of the New Georgia Constitution, 35 Mercer L.
Rev. 1, 1-2 (1983).
54. These requirements are summarized in 33 Book of the States, supra note
1, at 5-7 tabs. 1.2-1.3 (providing a summary of most states' requirements for
constitutional amendment and revision). Cf U.S. Const. art. V (providing the
established mode of amending the Constitution of the United States).
55. See G. Alan Tarr, Models and Fashions in State Constitutionalism, 1998
Wis. L. Rev. 729, 734.
56. See Comwell, supra note 39, at 156-59; Tarr, Understanding State
Constitutions, supra note 17, at 153-156.
57. See generally Tarr, supra note 55.
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states to deal with those problems. Finally, it would seek to
anticipate the problems likely to emerge in the first half of the
twenty-first century and to show how state constitutions might be
crafted to enable the states to deal most effectively with those
problems. Although the task is a daunting one, it is crucial for
serious constitutional reform, and, thus, one that should be the
highest priority for state constitutional scholars.
